The zero-leverage phenomenon in European listed firms: A financing decision or an imposition of the financial market? by Morais, Flávio et al.
Creative Commons CC BY: This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 
License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) which permits any use, reproduction and distribution of the 





© The Author(s) 2021
Article reuse guidelines: 
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1 77/2340944 21 0246
journals.sagepub.com/home/brq
Introduction
A recent line of research in corporate finance investigates 
the phenomenon that has become known as “mysterious 
zero leverage,” after the contemporary studies of Strebulaev 
and Yang (2013), which found that an important and 
increasing proportion of firms had been presenting no debt 
over the years, and Devos et al. (2012), which showed that 
zero leverage is a persistent phenomenon.1 Also intriguing 
is the fact that the existence of debt-free firms seems to be 
a global phenomenon, being present all over the world 
(Bessler et al., 2013) and including both large, listed firms 
(Strebulaev & Yang, 2013) and small, unlisted firms 
(Ramalho & Silva, 2009). Moreover, the zero-leverage 
phenomenon is not confined to the lack of long-term debt, 
but also refers to zero short-term debt (Strebulaev & Yang, 
2013). Firms such as Apple, Amazon, and Yahoo are exam-
ples of organizations that in a given period have adopted 
extremely conservative levels of debt, even reaching an 
unexpected zero-leverage level.2
The complexity of the zero-leverage phenomenon 
increases inasmuch as the classical theories of capital struc-
ture, namely, the trade-off, pecking-order, and agency theo-
ries, are not able to explain such conservative levels of 
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debt. The lack of theoretical support has led academics to 
present alternative approaches to explain zero leverage, 
such as the financial constraints theory, where zero lever-
age emerges as an imposition of creditors, and the financial 
flexibility hypothesis, which states that firms avoid using 
debt in order to retain financial flexibility. Nevertheless, 
despite the considerable advances made during the last dec-
ade, it is still not clear which are the theoretical approaches 
that best explain the zero-leverage phenomenon, as recently 
stressed by Saona et al. (2020).
A drawback of existing studies on zero-leverage firms is 
their focus on countries with market-based financial systems, 
especially the United States, which favors financing through 
the capital market rather than through bank debt (La Porta 
et al., 1997). Although studies considering other countries and 
financial systems do exist (Bessler et al., 2013; Ghoul et al., 
2018; Saona et al., 2020), their results are likely to have been 
strongly influenced by the considerable number of debt-free 
US firms present in their samples. A more balanced context to 
study zero leverage is provided by European countries. 
Indeed, Europe is the home of the largest banking system of 
the world, with non-financial firms being very dependent on 
bank loans as the primary source of external finance 
(European Investment Bank, 2015), but at the same time 
includes a relevant proportion of firms operating in countries 
with market-based financial systems. Therefore, the European 
context seems to be the ideal for studying not only the general 
effect of the financial system on the zero-leverage phenome-
non, as Ghoul et al. (2018) did using a sample that included 
some European countries, but also to test whether the relative 
importance of the financial constraints and financial flexibil-
ity hypotheses to explain zero-leverage decisions varies 
across countries with different financial systems.
Another issue that has not been fully analyzed is the 
impact of the financial crisis initiated in 2008 on zero lever-
age. In various countries, this crisis has been related to the 
sovereign debt crises that until very recently prevented the 
normal economic growth, the availability of finance and the 
recovery of investment levels, particularly in Western 
European countries (Dolz et al., 2019; European Investment 
Bank, 2015). Although the reduction in credit demand and 
supply is expected to have favored the zero-leverage phe-
nomenon, the economic crisis, by reducing the internal 
resources generated by firms, may have forced former zero-
leverage firms to resort to debt after 2008 (Ramalho et al., 
2018). To the best of our knowledge, only Morais et al. 
(2020) analyzed the effect of the 2008 global crisis on the 
existence of zero-debt firms. However, several questions 
remain to be answered, such as whether that effect was simi-
lar across countries with different financial systems or 
whether the financial constraints hypothesis gained rele-
vance during the crisis.
In an attempt to fill the previously identified gaps, this 
study focuses on the following research questions: (1) 
Does zero leverage in the European context result mainly 
from financial constraints experienced by firms or from the 
desire of maintaining financial flexibility?; (2) Is the 
increasing phenomenon of zero leverage observable in all 
European countries, irrespective of their financial sys-
tems?; (3) Has the recent financial crises increased the 
phenomenon of zero leverage in Europe? and (4) Are the 
answers to questions 1–3 independent or inter-related? To 
answer these questions, we use an unbalanced panel of 
8,676 listed firms from 14 European countries for the 
1995–2016 period. The sample, which was collected from 
the DataStream database, includes information that allows 
the construction of a set of proxy variables representing 
the financial constraints and financial flexibility approaches 
in order to examine whether zero leverage can be explained 
by both theories. It also comprises a relatively balanced 
number of firm-year observations between countries with 
market- and bank-based financial systems and covers the 
whole period of the most recent banking crises and sover-
eign debt crises in Europe, which, for some countries, 
according to Laeven and Valencia (2018), went until 2012.
This article contributes in several ways to the literature. 
Confirming previous evidence (Bessler et al., 2013; Morais 
et al., 2020), our results show that also at the European 
level there are two types of zero-leverage firms: finan-
cially constrained firms that are unable to get any funding; 
and financially unconstrained firms, which maintain zero 
leverage by choice. Also, similarly to Ghoul et al. (2018), 
we confirm that the financial system prevailing in the 
country, as well as the level of stock market development, 
are important determinants of zero leverage, with firms in 
countries with market-based systems being more prone to 
be unlevered. In addition, we show that the recent finding 
by Morais et al. (2020) that the European financial and 
sovereign debt crises increased the propensity for zero lev-
erage, actually is only valid for market-based countries, 
since no significant changes occurred in bank-based coun-
tries. Another novel result uncovered by our study is the 
fact that the relevance of the financial flexibility hypothe-
sis is higher in market-based systems and that, contrary to 
what could be expected, the financial constraints approach 
did not gain importance with the 2008 crisis. Finally, we 
show that our conclusions are robust to the use of alterna-
tive measures of debt conservatism, explanatory variables 
and econometric methods, including instrumental variable 
models that allow for endogeneity in firm size and divi-
dend payments. A preliminary propensity score matching 
analysis also provides similar results. Overall, our results 
show that (at least some of) the conflicting results found in 
previous studies may be due to the incorrect assumption 
they made of a unique, homogeneous effect of each deter-
minant of zero leverage across different realities.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. 
Section “Literature review and research hypotheses” briefly 
reviews theoretical explanations of the zero-leverage phe-
nomenon and formulates some empirical hypotheses. Section 
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“Data and methodology” describes the data and the method-
ology used in the empirical analysis. Section “Empirical 
results” presents and discusses the results obtained by both 
univariate and multivariate data analyses. Finally, section 
“Conclusion” contains some final considerations.
Literature review and research 
hypotheses
Studies on the “zero-leverage phenomenon” need to resort 
to explanatory approaches alternative to the main financial 
theories. This article focuses on two firm-level arguments 
(financial constraints and financial flexibility) and on two 
macroeconomic factors (financial system and the global 
financial crisis), and on their interaction, as possible expla-
nations for zero leverage. Next, we review the main theo-
retical arguments underlying each class of zero-leverage 
determinants and formulate a set of empirical hypotheses 
that will be tested in section “Empirical results.”
Internal determinants of the zero-leverage 
phenomenon: the financial constraints and the 
financial flexibility approaches
The financial constraints approach is the hypothesis most 
widely accepted by researchers as an explanation of the 
zero-leverage phenomenon. According to this theory, in 
the presence of capital market imperfections, capital struc-
ture is not only determined by the need for capital (i.e., the 
demand side), but mainly by the possibility of obtaining 
external finance (i.e., the supply side). Therefore, deci-
sions about debt are not taken only by firms, but also by 
creditors that may be willing to grant or not debt to them. 
In this context, the zero-leverage phenomenon is more an 
imposition of creditors due to financial market imperfec-
tions than the firm’s own financing decision.
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) developed a theoretical model 
which shows that, in the presence of market frictions such 
as information asymmetries, debt can become too expen-
sive. This prevents firms from funding projects with a 
positive net present value (NPV) through external finance, 
which may force firms to forego good investment opportu-
nities (Almeida & Campello, 2007). Indeed, financially 
constrained firms face restrictions in accessing credit, 
because lenders are not able to assess the quality of their 
future investments due to information asymmetries 
(Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). Furthermore, Diamond (1991) 
states that in the presence of adverse selection and moral 
hazard problems external finance becomes more difficult 
for firms with little reputation, that is, firms without a 
favorable past in the credit market.
In terms of empirical research, Bessler et al. (2013) and 
Devos et al. (2012) find strong evidence that zero-leverage 
firms are financially constrained. The authors also conclude 
that such firms are smaller, present a lower asset tangibility 
and have not yet acquired a favorable reputation in the debt 
market. More recently, Huang et al. (2017) show that firms 
that face financial constraints more frequently are more 
likely to present zero leverage.
Based on the theoretical arguments and empirical evi-
dence described, we test the following hypothesis:
H1: Financial constraints increase the firm’s likelihood 
of having zero leverage.
Regarding the financial flexibility hypothesis, this 
approach suggests that firms avoid debt because of their 
financing decisions and not of their inability to obtain 
external finance. The literature relates financial flexibility 
to the firm’s capacity to fund future investments, even in 
the presence of information asymmetries (Ferrando et al., 
2017; Gamba & Triantis, 2008). It is considered that the 
capacity to timely react to unexpected changes in the 
firm’s activity is improved by its financial flexibility 
(Denis, 2011). Recognizing the interdependence over time 
between the firm’s financing and investment decisions is 
the starting point for enhancing the importance of financial 
flexibility.
Survey evidence points out that financial managers 
consider financial flexibility as a determinant factor of 
firm’s capital structure decisions, indicating that they vol-
untarily limit credit lines to maintain firm’s debt capacity 
to turn to credit in the future (Brounen et al., 2006; 
Campello et al., 2010). Recognizing that financial flexibil-
ity allows firms to mitigate both financial distress costs 
and the underinvestment problem in situations of restricted 
access to external finance (Rapp et al., 2014), firms have 
an incentive to present high levels of cash holdings as well 
as to preserve their borrowing capacity (de Jong et al., 
2012). Internal liquidity is then a determinant factor of 
financial flexibility (Ferrando et al., 2017). However, 
Marchica and Mura (2010) conclude that firms with low 
levels of debt try to maintain their financial flexibility 
through a low level of investment and turning to debt only 
when good investment opportunities arise.
Empirically, Bessler et al. (2013) present evidence that 
some debt-free firms deliberately adopt a debt conserva-
tism policy. They conclude that such firms are typically 
more profitable and have a greater level of cash holdings 
than leveraged firms. Dang (2013) states that firms with 
greater levels of growth opportunities and liquidity are 
more likely to avoid debt, this being explained by the 
search for financial flexibility. He concludes also that the 
strategic decision to hold zero leverage prevails essentially 
in firms without financial constraints. Finally, Huang et al. 
(2017) show that firms with a greater level of financial 
flexibility are, in fact, more likely to have zero leverage.
Considering these arguments, we formulate the follow-
ing hypothesis:
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H2: Financial flexibility increases the firm’s likelihood 
of having zero leverage.
External determinants of the zero-leverage 
phenomenon: the financial system and the 
2008 global financial crisis
Previous research suggests that decisions regarding capital 
structure are affected not only by firms’ specific factors but 
also by their country’s specific characteristics. For exam-
ple, Ghoul et al. (2018) report that zero leverage is more 
prominent in developed and high-income countries. In the 
case of Europe, analyzing the phenomenon of extreme 
financial conservatism implies to highlight the importance 
of the banking sector. In recent decades, the European 
banking sector has shown strong development, presenting 
much stronger growth than that registered in other banking 
systems across the world (Langfield & Pagano, 2016). In 
the recent study by Takami (2016), it is argued that the 
reduced level of debt-free firms in Japan may be explained 
by the bank-based financial system that prevails in the 
country. Actually, although Japan is a country known for 
its highly developed banking system, such system has 
even a greater weight in Europe (Langfield & Pagano, 
2016). Such a high preponderance of the bank-based finan-
cial system is reflected in the European firms’ great 
dependence on funding from banks (Fernández-Méndez 
and González, 2019; Langfield & Pagano, 2016). Indeed, 
European non-financial firms are more dependent on bank 
loans as the first source of external finance than firms in 
the US and Japan (European Investment Bank, 2015).
However, market-based financial systems are charac-
terized by a generally well-functioning stock market, with 
greater size and liquidity (Drobetz et al., 2015), which is 
more attractive to external investors than bank-based 
financial systems. Therefore, in countries with market-
based financial systems firms tend to have a wider range of 
available sources of financing. Taking into account the 
characteristics of both bank- and market-based financial 
systems, countries with market-oriented system are 
expected to have a greater proportion of debt-free firms 
than those with bank-oriented systems (Ghoul et al., 2018). 
Hence, the following research hypothesis is postulated:
H3: A financial system based on capital markets (banks) 
increases (decreases) the firm’s likelihood of having 
zero leverage.
Firm’s financing decisions are also determined by mac-
roeconomic conditions. However, the effect of macroeco-
nomic conditions on capital structure is somewhat 
ambiguous. Choe et al. (1993) show that in periods of eco-
nomic growth, the costs of adverse selection are lower, 
which motivates a greater volume of share issuances. 
Therefore, given that firms’ preference for financing through 
equity is higher in periods of economic growth, equity 
issues are considered to be pro-cyclical and debt to be coun-
ter-cyclical. Another theoretical perspective points out that 
asset values fall in periods of uncertainty and macroeco-
nomic shocks, which is reflected in a lower firm’s net worth 
and collateral (Brunnermeier & Oehmke, 2013). Therefore, 
in periods of economic recession, firms turn less to credit 
because the value of their collateral falls. In this view, both 
collateral and debt are pro-cyclical (Kiyotaki & Moore, 
1997).
There are some studies relating macroeconomic condi-
tions with zero leverage. Dang (2013) shows that in 
adverse macroeconomic conditions, represented by a low, 
or negative, GDP growth rate, a firm’s likelihood of adopt-
ing zero leverage increases. A similar result is obtained by 
Ghose and Kabra (2016), and so the authors conclude that 
zero leverage is counter-cyclical as regards macroeco-
nomic conditions. More recently, Morais et al. (2020) 
showed that the 2008 financial crisis reduced the firms’ 
propensity to resort to debt.
In this article, we are particularly interested in estimat-
ing the effects of the recent global financial crisis on zero 
leverage. Considering that the 2008 US subprime crisis 
was transformed into a sovereign debt crisis in 2010 in 
several European countries (Laeven & Valencia, 2018), 
preventing the availability and access to external sources 
of finance (European Investment Bank, 2015), it is 
expected that the recent crisis experienced in Europe had 
an important effect on zero leverage. Indeed, during peri-
ods of macroeconomic shocks, the access to external 
finance generally becomes more expensive and difficult 
due to increasing information asymmetries and default 
risk. On one hand, the uncertainty about the real value of 
the firm and the quality of their investments reduce the 
creditor willingness to grant debt (Kiyotaki & Moore, 
1997; Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). On the other hand, the sub-
stantial losses faced by financial institutions during the 
recent financial crisis may also have decreased their loan 
activities (Ivashina & Scharfstein, 2010).
Based on these arguments, we expect that one conse-
quence of the 2008 global crisis was an increment in the 
proportion of zero-debt firms. Thus, the following hypoth-
esis is formulated:
H4: The 2008 global financial crisis increased the 
firms’ likelihood of having zero leverage.
The great dependence of firms on debt in bank-based 
countries results in closer ties and less information asym-
metries between firms and banks, which can arguably miti-
gate the negative effects of the crisis on access to debt 
financing (Leland & Pyle, 1977). Therefore, firms from bank-
based systems may benefit from their closer relationships 
with banks to keep access to debt at a fair condition during 
crisis periods, while firms from market-based systems may be 
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forced to renounce the use of debt in such periods to avoid the 
aggravated costs. Hence, while it is expected that the 2008 
crisis increased zero leverage in both bank- and market-based 
financial systems, one could also expect that firms located in 
bank-based financial systems were less impacted than their 
peers located in market-based countries. Thus, we argue that 
the crisis may have had a different effect on zero leverage 
depending on the financial system being considered and for-
mulate the following hypothesis:
H5: The impact of the 2008 financial crisis on firm’s 
likelihood of having zero leverage was higher in coun-
tries with market-based financial systems.
Interactions between zero-leverage internal and 
external determinants
So far, the literature on zero leverage has considered inde-
pendently the effects of internal and external determinants 
on zero leverage, assuming they are homogeneous across 
different contexts. For example, while Bessler et al. (2013) 
and Ghoul et al. (2018) present evidence of a direct impact 
of country legal and/or financial system on zero leverage, 
they assume that the effects of internal determinants are 
identical across countries. Similarly, the direct impact of 
the 2008 crisis on firm’s and creditor’s debt decisions was 
estimated by Morais et al. (2020) assuming that the effects 
of internal determinants were the same during the crisis 
and non-crisis years. However, there are some connections 
between internal and external factors that may boost or 
attenuate their influence on zero leverage. Therefore, we 
formulate two additional hypotheses that consider their 
joint influence in cases that we think are particularly 
important.
The stronger protection to minority shareholders and the 
higher flow of information existent in countries with well-
functioning and developed capital markets increase inves-
tors’ willingness to invest (La Porta et al., 2002), providing 
firms with a wider range of alternative and attractive 
sources of financing than in bank-based systems, where the 
relationships are mainly established with banks (Leland & 
Pyle, 1977). In particular, the greater number of investors 
and the higher liquidity of capital markets in market-ori-
ented systems give firms a better chance to replace debt by 
equity and remain debt-free. Therefore, it is easier for firms 
located in those countries to keep their financial flexibility 
and, hence, their borrowing capacity to finance future 
investment opportunities that may arise (de Jong et al., 
2012). For example, more profitable firms, with higher lev-
els of internal liquidity and holding future good prospects, 
have more chances to be debt-free in market systems than 
in bank systems, where, instead of building up financial 
flexibility, firms often have to use their operational profits 
and liquidity to comply with debt repayment plans. Thus, 
the financial flexibility approach may apply, particularly, to 
firms in countries with market-based systems, that is, there 
is a higher propensity for those firms to adopt zero-leverage 
policies due to their own decision. Therefore, the following 
hypothesis will be tested:
H6: The expected positive effect of financial flexibility 
on the firm’s likelihood of having zero leverage is 
strengthened in market-based systems.
However, the overall increase in information asym-
metries and default risk during crisis periods are expected 
to hamper the access to external finance. In particular, the 
arguments put forward in section “External determinants of 
the zero-leverage phenomenon: the financial system and 
the 2008 global financial crisis” suggest that the recent 
financial and sovereign debt crises aggravated firms’ finan-
cial constraints and, hence, firms’ access to debt got worse 
due to creditors’ imposition. From the debt supply side, 
there are some reasons that may lead creditors to aggravate 
the conditions to grant debt to firms during periods of cri-
sis. As argued by the balance sheet channel perspective, 
asset values fall during crisis, which, together with the 
uncertainty about the real value of the firm, increases con-
siderably the risk taken by creditors and consequently 
reduces their willingness to grant debt (Kiyotaki & Moore, 
1997; Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). Moreover, creditors may 
react to the substantial losses faced by financial institutions 
during the crisis by promoting a contraction in credit avail-
ability to firms or requiring higher interest rates (Ivashina 
& Scharfstein, 2010; Santos, 2011). Although this situation 
affects all firms, firms with little reputation are expected to 
be even more affected and to have even more difficulties to 
raise debt (Diamond, 1991). Therefore, smaller firms with 
low percentage of asset tangibility and low-dividend pay-
ments are expected to be more prone to have zero leverage 
during the crisis period due to creditors imposition. Thus, 
financial constraints arguments for zero leverage may 
acquire more relevance during the crisis period.
Hence, we hypothesize that:
H7: The expected positive effect of financial con-
straints on the firm’s likelihood of having zero leverage 
was strengthened during the 2008 financial crisis.
Data and methodology
The accounting, financial and market data about the listed 
European firms included in our sample were obtained from 
the DataStream database provided by Thomson Reuters. 
Data were collected for the period between 1995 and 2016 
for 14 Western European countries (Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the UK). 
These countries were selected to ensure the availability of 
information for listed firms during the period of analysis.
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As in previous studies about capital structure, utilities 
and financial firms were excluded from the sample due to 
the different regulations that these firms are subject to. 
Following the recent study by Sardo and Serrasqueiro 
(2018), we used the FTSE/Dow Jones Industry Classification 
Benchmark (ICB), and so firms with an industry code of 
7000-7999 (Utilities) or 8000-8999 (Financials), as well as 
firms without industry code, were excluded from the sam-
ple. Then, we removed from the sample firm-year observa-
tions with missing information for total assets, sales or total 
debt. Finally, we excluded firm-year observations with inva-
lid information or obvious errors for assets, sales and short 
and long-term debt. To mitigate potential survivorship bias, 
we allowed firms’ entry and exit from the sample. After 
applying those cleaning and filtering criteria, the final sam-
ple contains 8,676 listed firms corresponding to an unbal-
anced panel data of 88,348 firm-year observations.
Table 1 provides a definition of the variables consid-
ered in the main econometric models and also of the addi-
tional variables that were used to test the robustness of our 
main results. The dependent variable (ZL) has a binary 
nature, being 1 if total debt is equal to zero in a given year. 
In this calculation we considered only financial debt and 
excluded non-debt liabilities, since our focus is on financ-
ing decisions (Strebulaev & Yang, 2013).
As determinants of ZL, we consider several proxies for 
the factors related to the hypotheses formulated in section 
“Literature review and research hypotheses.” Regarding 
the financial constraints hypothesis, there is not a unique, 
consensual way to measure financial constraints (see 
Almeida et al., 2004). Therefore, various proxies for the 
willingness of creditors to grant credit to a firm have been 
used in the literature, in particular firm size (Cleary, 2006; 
Guariglia, 2008; Hadlock & Pierce, 2010), dividend pay-
ments (Cleary, 2006; Dang, 2013; Fazzari et al., 1988) and 
asset tangibility (Benmelech & Bergman, 2009).3 These 
firm-specific characteristics can be seen as proxies for the 
degree to which firms are more exposed to information 
asymmetries and, thus, for the difficulty in obtaining exter-
nal finance (Guariglia, 2008). Specifically, firms of smaller 
size and firms that do not pay out dividends have generally 
less reputation, which makes it difficult to obtain external 
finance, inasmuch as lenders require greater compensation 
for the risk in granting credit to such firms. Simultaneously, 
tangible assets serve as collateral to debt, which grants 
creditors protection in case of firms’ default, implying that 
firms with lower asset tangibility are more likely to face 
information asymmetries and consequent credit rationing 
(Benmelech & Bergman, 2009). Alternatively, researchers 
have used composite indexes of financial constraints, such 
as the SA-index (Hadlock & Pierce, 2010), the WW-index 
(Whited & Wu, 2006) and the KZ-index (Kaplan & 
Zingales, 1997; Lamont et al., 2001), which are con-
structed weighting differently several firm-specific char-
acteristics assumed to be related to the existence of 
financial constraints. In the three cases, a higher (lower) 
value for the index suggests that greater (smaller) financial 
constraints are faced by firms. Another possible strategy 
for proxying financial constraints is to use the dummy 
variables defined in Table 1, which are based on the Size, 
Dividend payout, and Tangibility variables, but distinguish 
directly financially constrained firms (firms with values in 
the first terciles of those variables—smaller firms, firms 
with a lower dividend payout or firms with less tangible 
assets) from the unconstrained ones (firms in the last ter-
cile). This approach may provide additional insights, since 
using the continuous values of the three mentioned varia-
bles may not completely identify and differentiate firms 
with different levels of constraints. In order to reduce mis-
classification of constrained and unconstrained firms, all 
analyses based on the dummy variables exclude firms in 
the second tercile of Size, Dividend payout, or Tangibility.
Similarly, in the literature there is no well-defined 
measure of financial flexibility, this being a non-observa-
ble factor that depends greatly on managers’ assessment of 
future growth opportunities (Ferrando et al., 2017). 
Nevertheless, previous studies have assessed financial 
flexibility by resorting mostly to measures related to debt 
and/or internal liquidity (Arslan-Ayaydin et al., 2014; 
Ferrando et al., 2017; Gamba & Triantis, 2008; Marchica 
& Mura, 2010). In this article, we consider three of those 
measures as proxies for financial flexibility: cash holdings, 
profitability and growth opportunities. Firms with a higher 
level of any of these measures are expected to have a 
greater ability or desire to build up financial flexibility. In 
addition, as in the previous case, we use dummy variables 
distinguishing between the most and least financially flex-
ible firms.
To analyze the effect of the financial system, three 
alternative proxies are used. First, we construct a dummy 
variable based on an indicator developed by Demirgüç-
Kunt and Levine (2004) that allows the partition of the 
sample into countries with a market-based financial sys-
tem and countries with a bank-based financial system. 
Second, we use the Stock market capitalization variable, 
an indicator of the size of the stock market (Beck et al., 
2000), also interpreted as a measure of stock market devel-
opment (Aktas et al., 2019). Finally, because common law 
countries favor the development of market-based financial 
systems (Demirgüç-Kunt & Levine, 1999), we use a 
dummy variable based on the legal system prevailing in 
the country, a variable that has also been considered by 
Bessler et al. (2013) to explore the effect of country spe-
cificities on zero leverage.
For the crisis, we use a dummy variable based on the 
recent classification developed by Laeven and Valencia 
(2018) about banking, currency and sovereign debt crises, 
which recognizes that the 2008 global financial crisis 
affected European countries in different ways and assigns 
distinct final years for the crisis in each country.
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Table 1. Definition of the model variables.
Variable Definition
Panel A: Main variables
Dependent variable
 ZL Equals 1 if a firm has zero short-term debt and zero long-term debt in a given year and is 0 otherwise.
Proxies for financial constraints
 Size Logarithm of total book assets (thousand Euro).
 Dividend payout Ratio of common dividend to total book assets.
 Tangibility Ratio of fixed assets to total book assets.
 SA-index The Size-Age index is constructed as (− 0.737 × Size) + (0.043 × Size2) – (0.040 × Age), where Age 
is the difference between the year of the observation and the first date that the firm appears in the 
DataStream database with trading available data and Size is as defined previously (Hadlock & Pierce, 
2010).
 WW-index The WW-index is constructed as −0.091 × CFlow − 0.062 × DIVPOS + 0.021 × TLTD − 0.044 
× LNTA + 0.102 × ISG − 0.035 × SG, where CFlow = (Net income + Depreciation)/Total assets, 
DIVPOS is an indicator set to 1 if the firm has positive dividends, TLTD = Long term debt/Total assets, 
LNTA = Size, ISG is the average industry sales growth and SG is the firm’s sales growth (Whited & Wu, 
2006).
 KZ-index The KZ-index is constructed as −1.002 × CashFlow + 0.283 × Q + 3.139 × Lev − 39.368 × Div − 
1.315 × Cash, where CashFlow = (Net income + Depreciation)/lagged property, plant and equipment, 
Q refers to Tobin’s Q (total assets minus book equity plus market capitalization, divided by total 
assets), Lev = Ratio of short and long-term debt to total book assets, Div = Ratio of common dividend 
to lagged property, plant and equipment, and Cash = Ratio of cash and short-term investments to 
lagged property, plant and equipment (Lamont et al., 2001).
 Size_d Equals 1 if the firm’s size is in the first tercile of the variable Size (smaller firms) and 0 if it is in tercile 3 
(larger firms). Terciles are calculated separately for each year. Firm-year observations in the first tercile 
are classified as financially constrained, while those in tercile 3 are classified as being unconstrained.
 Dividend_d Equals 1 if the firm’s dividend payments are in the first tercile of the variable Dividend payout (low-
dividend payers) and 0 if it is in tercile 3 (high-dividend payers). Terciles are calculated separately for 
each year. Firm-year observations in the first tercile are classified as financially constrained, while those 
in tercile 3 are classified as being unconstrained.
 Tangibility_d Equals 1 if the firm’s asset tangibility is in the first tercile of the variable Tangibility (low asset tangibility) 
and 0 if it is in tercile 3 (high asset tangibility). Terciles are calculated separately for each year. Firm-
year-observations in the first tercile are classified as financially constrained, while those in tercile 3 are 
classified as being unconstrained.
Proxies for financial flexibility
 Cash holdings Ratio of cash and short-term investments to book assets.
  Growth 
opportunities
Market-to-book ratio (the market value of equity plus the book value of debt, divided by total assets).
 Profitability Ratio of earnings before interests, taxes, and depreciation (EBITDA) to total book assets.
 Cash_d Equals 1 if the firm’s cash holdings are in the third tercile of the variable Cash holdings (higher cash 
ratios) and 0 if it is in tercile 1 (lower cash ratios). Terciles are calculated separately for each year. 
Firm-year observations in the third tercile are classified as highly financially flexible.
 Growth_d Equals 1 if the firm’s growth prospects are in the third tercile of the variable Growth opportunities 
(higher growth) and 0 if it is in tercile 1 (lower growth). Terciles are calculated separately for each 
year. Firm-year observations in the third tercile are classified as highly financially flexible.
 Profitability_d Equals 1 if the firm’s profits are in the third tercile of the variable Profitability (higher profitability) and 
0 if it is in tercile 1 (lower profitability). Terciles are calculated separately for each year. Firm-year 
observations in the third tercile are classified as highly financially flexible.
Proxies for the financial system
 Market system Equals 1 if a financial system is market-based (a higher level of stock market development relative to 
banking sector development) and 0 if it is bank-baseda (source: Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2004).
  Stock market 
capitalization
Total value of listed shares in a stock market divided by GDP (source: Beck et al., 2000; data were 
obtained from the Global Financial Development Database).
 Legal system Equals 1 for countries with a common law system and 0 for countries with a civil law systemb (source: 
Djankov et al., 2007 and The World Factbook, CIA).
(Continued)
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Finally, the econometric models also include control vari-
ables shown in previous studies as having power in explain-
ing capital structure decisions. These control variables are: 
Capital expenditures, Taxes, Non-debt tax shields, Earnings 
volatility, and GDP growth rate (Bessler et al., 2013; Dang, 
2013; Strebulaev & Yang, 2013). In order to control for non-
observed specific effects, all models include dummy varia-
bles for industry (based on the 1-digit ICB code) and some 
models also consider country and year dummies.
We perform both univariate and multivariate analyses 
to investigate which firms’ characteristics stimulate zero-
leverage policies. In the multivariate analysis, as a conse-
quence of the binary nature of the dependent variable, it is 
required the use of an econometric method appropriate for 
such response variable, since, for example, standard esti-
mators such as ordinary least squares assume that the 
dependent variable can take on any real negative or posi-
tive value (Wooldridge, 2012). In particular, pooled logit 
regression models are used to estimate the impact of the 
explanatory variables on the likelihood of a firm having 
zero leverage. The logit model has the following form:
 Pr ZL=1 x  = 1/ 1+e| [ - x( ) ( ) ]β  (1)
where x represents the vector containing some of the explan-
atory variables defined in Table 1 (including also a constant 
term) and β represents the vector of the variable coefficients. 
In the robustness section other models will be considered, 
including probit models, random and fixed effects models 
and an instrumental variable approach. Propensity score 
matching will also be considered in a preliminary analysis.
Empirical results
Univariate analysis
Sample. We begin the empirical part of the paper by pre-
senting a brief description of the research sample. Table 2 
Variable Definition
Proxies for the 2008 financial crisis
 Crisis Equals 1 if the observation corresponds to the years of financial and sovereign debt crises in Europe 
(the period of crisis goes from 2008 to 2009, 2011 or 2012, depending on the country being 
considered)c and is 0 otherwise (Source: Laeven & Valencia, 2018).
Control variables
 Capital expenditure Ratio of capital expenditures to total book assets.
 Taxes Ratio of income taxes paid to total book assets.
 Non-debt tax shields Ratio of depreciation and amortizations to total book assets.
 Earnings volatility The absolute value of the difference between firm’s annual % change in EBITDA and the (time-series) 
average of those changes.
 GDP growth rate Annual GDP growth rate (Source: World Development Indicators, The World Bank).
Panel B: Other variables
Alternative dependent variables
 AZL Equals 1 if the book leverage ratio is below 5% and is 0 otherwise.
 ZL3 Equals 1 if a firm has a zero debt during three consecutive years and is 0 otherwise.
 LTZL Equals 1 if a firm has zero long-term debt in a given year and is 0 otherwise.
 STZL Equals 1 if a firm has zero short-term debt in a given year and is 0 otherwise.
Additional control variables
 Age Difference between the year of the observation and the first date of trading available at DataStream.
 Short-term liabilities Ratio of short-term liabilities other than debt to total book assets.
 Board size Logarithm of total number of board members.
 Board independency Proportion of independent board members.
 CEO duality Dummy that equals 1 if the CEO holds simultaneously a position on the board of directors and is 0 
otherwise.
  Ownership 
concentration
Percentage of shareholdings of 5% or more held by employees or by individual investors.
GDP: gross domestic product.
aAustria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain are considered to have bank-based financial systems, while 
Denmark, The Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK have market-based financial systems. b The group of common law countries is composed by 
Ireland and UK, while Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Finland, France, Italy, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden are 
identified as civil law countries. c The longest crisis period is considered only for the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Portugal 
and Spain. For UK, the crisis period is 2008–2011 and for the remaining countries only the 2008–2009 period is considered as a crisis period. See 
Laeven and Valencia (2018).
Table 1. (Continued)
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shows the distribution of observations and firms by coun-
try and financial system for both the full sample and the 
sub-sample of debt-free firms. Between 1995 and 2016 
around 10.84% of firm-year observations are classified as 
having zero leverage, with debt-free firms being signifi-
cantly present in all countries. The dimension of this 
result is even more noteworthy if we consider that almost 
29% of firms present zero-leverage levels in at least one 
year. Nevertheless, these values are lower than those 
reported in most studies developed for the Unites States 
(Strebulaev & Yang, 2013) and the United Kingdom 
(Dang, 2013). Comparing with papers including other 
countries, the values reported here are also lower than 
those found by Bessler et al. (2013) and Ghoul et al. 
(2018), where about 18% and 13% of observations corre-
spond to debt-free firms, respectively.
A more detailed analysis reveals great heterogeneity in 
the distribution of zero-leverage firms between countries, 
with Sweden (20.36%) and UK (16.61%) presenting the 
greatest proportions of zero-leverage observations and 
France, Italy, Portugal and Spain the lowest (between 2% 
and 3%). Since the first two countries are characterized by 
market-based financial systems and the last four by bank-
based systems, it seems that, as hypothesized, there may 
be a relationship between the level of development of the 
financial system and the zero-leverage phenomenon. The 
same conclusion is achieved when we compare the aver-
age percentage of observations of debt-free firms in coun-
tries with market and bank-based systems (16.12% and 
6.26%, respectively).
Trends of zero leverage. There is consensus in the literature 
about an increasing trend toward zero leverage over the 
years (e.g., Bessler et al., 2013; Ghoul et al., 2018). In 
order to confirm a similar trend in Europe, Figure 1 shows 
the evolution of zero leverage over the period 1995–2016, 
both in global terms and by financial system. It is clear an 
upward trend of zero leverage for the full sample. The pro-
portion of firms with zero leverage was 5.15% in 1995, 
increased fairly steady until 2006 (12.81%), stagnated dur-
ing the global financial crisis (12.11%–12.87% between 
2008 and 2010), peaked in 2014 (13.92%) and reached 
11.94% in 2016, more than doubling during the period of 
analysis.
Figure 1 also shows marked differences in the distribu-
tion and evolution of zero leverage between the two finan-
cial systems considered. In countries with a market-based 
financial system, zero leverage increased considerably 
over the years, with the proportion of debt-free firms 
almost tripling between the beginning (6.79%) and the end 
of the period of analysis (20.40% in 2015 and 17.93% in 
2016). However, for countries with a bank-based financial 
system, the increase of zero leverage was much less notice-
able. In fact, considering the evolution from 1996 (5.54%) 
to 2016 (6.42%), we find that the increase of zero leverage 
is residual, not even reaching 1 percentage point (pp). It 
increased slightly until 2004 and then fell until 2008, with 
the figures remaining similar until 2016.
Descriptive statistics. Table 3 presents descriptive statistics 
for the continuous variables defined in Table 1. In particular, 
Table 2. Sample characterisation by country.
Country All firms Debt-free firms
# obs. % obs. # firms % obs. % firmsa
Bank-based countries
 Austria 1,519 1.72 137 8.16 23.36
 Belgium 2,095 2.37 176 3.72 14.20
 Finland 2,636 2.98 202 3.76 13.37
 France 14,254 16.13 1,312 2.40 9.45
 Germany 12,992 14.71 1,129 12.85 34.46
 Greece 4,682 5.30 356 7.35 29.78
 Ireland 1,164 1.32 117 11.08 32.48
 Italy 4,297 4.86 381 2.19 9.97
 Portugal 1,149 1.30 105 2.61 9.52
 Spain 2,500 2.83 215 2.12 11.63
 Subtotal 47,288 53.52 4,130 6.26 19.71
Market-based countries
 Denmark 2,741 3.10 227 7.30 21.15
 The Netherlands 3,248 3.68 292 9.21 26.37
 Sweden 7,835 8.87 832 20.36 46.15
 UK 27,236 30.83 3,195 16.61 37.12
 Subtotal 41,060 46.48 4,546 16.12 37.29
Total 88,348 100.00 8,676 10.84 28.92
aFirms that present zero-leverage levels in at least 1 year.
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Panel A reports several descriptive statistics for the full sam-
ple, while Panel B presents the mean values for both zero-
leverage and leveraged firms and the results of t-tests for the 
mean differences across groups.
Table 3 shows that debt-free firms are smaller and have 
lower levels of tangible assets than leveraged firms, which 
is in line with the hypothesis of zero leverage arising from 
financial constraints (Benmelech & Bergman, 2009; 
Hadlock & Pierce, 2010). However, on average, debt-free 
firms pay out more dividends as a percentage of assets 
than leveraged firms. This result is against the financial 
constraints approach according to which firms paying 
more dividends suffer less from information asymmetries 
and have a better reputation and, hence, are less likely to 
be financially constrained (Cleary, 2006; Fazzari et al., 
1988). The composite measures of financial constraints are 
also not completely in accordance, since two of them show 
that on average debt-free firms are more financially con-
strained while the other (KZ-index, the only index that 
considers the actual value of the dividends) shows the 
opposite. In addition, the results show that firms with zero 
leverage, on average, present higher levels of growth 
opportunities and cash holdings than leveraged firms. 
These results are similar to those of Dang (2013) and are 
consistent with the argument of zero leverage being the 
result of a financing decision of firms, which aim at main-
taining financial flexibility to preserve their debt capacity 






















































Figure 1. Evolution over time of zero-leverage levels in different financial systems and in the whole sample.
Table 3. Descriptive statistics and mean characteristics of zero-leverage versus leveraged firms.
Variable Panel A: Full sample descriptive statistics Panel B: Mean characteristics of zero-
leverage and leveraged firms




T-test for diff. 
in means
Size 88,348 11.631 2.238 2.565 11.461 19.807 9.882 11.843 −84.150***
Dividend payout 83,785 0.018 0.038 0.000 0.006 0.897 0.028 0.017 26.782***
Tangibility 88,072 0.248 0.223 0.000 0.188 0.980 0.135 0.261 −52.860***
SA-index 88,348 −3.019 0.682 −5.238 −3.150 1.759 −2.981 −3.338 49.110***
WW-index 65,394 −0.576 0.328 −17.562 −0.569 8.733 −0.508 −0.584 18.040***
KZ-index 68,999 −11.805 25.915 −149.961 −2.540 77.180 −12.301 −9.599 −70.589***
Cash holdings 88,226 0.152 0.176 0.000 0.089 0.974 0.343 0.129 120.000***
Growth opportunities 79,490 1.431 1.728 0.004 0.946 19.853 2.398 1.316 55.383***
Profitability 86,423 0.070 0.228 −2.995 0.103 2.911 −0.004 0.079 −33.145***
Stock market capitalization 81,116 0.798 0.376 0.081 0.759 2.386 0.903 0.786 26.763***
Capital expenditures 82,765 0.054 0.068 0.000 0.035 0.843 0.040 0.056 −20.163***
Taxes 81,690 0.016 0.034 −0.199 0.012 0.299 0.017 0.016 2.811***
Non-debt tax shields 87,774 0.050 0.048 0.000 0.040 0.941 0.044 0.050 −12.169***
Earnings volatility 75,774 2.167 7.870 0.000 0.459 44.765 3.093 2.064 10.818***
GDP growth rate 88,348 1.902 2.272 −9.133 2.337 25.557 1.991 1.891 4.049***
GDP: gross domestic product.
***Significance at the 1% level.
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(Marchica & Mura, 2010). However, unlike what the 
financial flexibility theory predicts, debt-free firms are less 
profitable than leveraged firms.
Propensity score matching analysis. Because the previous 
analysis mixes zero-leverage firms with different charac-
teristics, we use the propensity score matching approach 
suggested by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) to further 
examine the effect of firm-specific variables proxying for 
financial constraints and financial flexibility on zero lever-
age. Propensity score matching analysis allows us to get a 
more balanced distribution of the values of the covariates 
across the groups of financially constrained and uncon-
strained firms, on one hand, and the groups of highly and 
little financially flexible firms, on the other hand. To imple-
ment this method, we first use the procedure described in 
Table 1 to divide firms into terciles and create the “treat-
ment” variables Size_d, Dividend_d, Tangibility_d, Cash_d, 
Growth_d, and Profitability_d. The first three variables are 
equal to 1 for financially constrained firms (“treatment” 
group) and to 0 otherwise (“control” or “non-treatment” 
group), while the last three are equal to 1 when firms are 
classified as highly financially flexible firms (“treatment” 
group) and to 0 otherwise (“control” group). Then, for each 
treatment variable, we use a logit model to estimate the cor-
responding propensity scores conditional on a set of other 
firm-specific characteristics (e.g., for Size_d, we consider 
Dividend payout, Tangibility, Cash holdings, Growth 
opportunities, and Profitability). Next, using nearest- 
neighbor matching, we match each constrained or highly 
financially flexible firm with the unconstrained or little 
financially flexible firms that display the closest predicted 
propensity scores, and vice-versa.4 Finally, we estimate the 
differences between the predicted probabilities of being a 
zero-leverage firm for each match and average those differ-
ences for the whole sample.
Table 4 reports the results obtained. In the first row we 
present the “treatment effect,” which in this case may be 
interpreted as the average difference in the predicted prob-
ability of being debt-free between financially constrained 
and unconstrained firms (columns (1)–(3)) and between 
highly and little financially flexible firms (columns (4)–
(6)). In the other rows we present, both for the original and 
matched sample, descriptive statistics and Rubin (2001) 
diagnostic criteria for the balance of the distribution of the 
covariate values for each group of firms. A perfect match-
ing would imply a standardized mean difference of zero 
across groups and a variance ratio of one. As can be seen, 
the level of balance between the groups improves substan-
tially in the matched sample in all cases. Nevertheless, the 
matching is never perfect and Rubin (2001) measures sug-
gest that in some cases the samples are not sufficiently bal-
anced. Therefore, the following conclusions should be 
seen as preliminary and must be confirmed by the 


























 Raw sample 0.456 0.446 0.540 0.406 0.253 0.429
 Matched sample 0.072 0.026 0.081 0.027 0.022 0.073
Rubin (2001) B statistic
 Raw sample 84.3# 123.4# 100.5# 94.3# 72.6# 113.1#
 Matched sample 25.9# 13.2 39.1# 4.1 10.8 31.9#
Variance ratios
 Raw sample 4.654 1.500 3.121 2.661 1.928 0.740
 Matched sample 1.079 1.260 0.916 0.962 1.391 0.653
Rubin (2001) R statistic
 Raw sample 7.98# 1.33 4.10# 1.20 2.42# 0.87
 Matched sample 0.73 1.67 0.49# 0.85 1.26 0.96
No. of observations 48,552 54,606 49,441 49,360 49,735 49,416
Robust standard errors, based on the correction by Abadie and Imbens (2016), are reported in parenthesis. Standardized mean differences are the 
means of the absolute values of the standardized differences of the sample means in the control and treatment sub-samples calculated separately 
for each independent variable considered in the estimation of the propensity scores. Rubin (2001) B statistic is an indicator of whether those 
differences are relevant (B > 25) or not (B < 25), being calculated as the absolute standardized difference of the means of the linear index of the 
propensity score in the control and treatment groups. Variance ratios are the means of the variance ratios of treated over control firms calculated 
separately for each independent variable considered in the estimation of the propensity scores. Rubin (2001) R statistic is an indicator of whether 
the variance ratios are relatively similar (0.5 ⩽ R ⩽ 2) or not (R < 0.5 or R > 2), being calculated as the ratio of treated to non-treated variances of 
the propensity score index.
#B > 25 or R outside [0.5, 2].
***Significance at the 1% level.
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multivariate regression analysis that we undertake in sec-
tion “Multivariate analysis.”
Overall, the results of Table 4 lead to conclusions simi-
lar to those of Table 3. The probability of being debt-free is 
higher by 12.3pp for small firms and 3.9pp for the firms 
with the lowest proportion of tangible assets, and lower by 
5.6pp for firms with the lowest dividend payouts. Thus, as 
before, the two first effects conform with the financial con-
straints theory, while the third is in contradiction. However, 
firms with the highest cash holdings and growth opportu-
nities have a higher probability of having zero leverage, 
while the most profitable ones are less likely to be debt-
free, the average difference in probability being 13.8pp, 
3.2pp, and −2.1pp, respectively. Again, the two first results 
are in accordance with the financial flexibility theory, 
while the third is in conflict.
Correlation analysis. Table 5 presents the Pearson pairwise 
correlation coefficients between the continuous independ-
ent variables.5 The results show that the correlations 
between the explanatory and control variables are not par-
ticularly high, being higher than 0.5 only for the pair (Size, 
SA-index), an expected result given that the composite 
measure is based on firm’s size. As shown in the last col-
umn, the variance inflation factor is always under 4, sug-
gesting that even in that case multicollinearity is not a 
problem.
Multivariate analysis
Results for the internal determinants of zero leverage. Table 6 
presents the results of the models that allow us to test the 
hypotheses concerning the internal determinants of zero 
leverage. The eight estimated logit regression models differ 
only on the set of independent variables considered. For 
each independent variable, we report the estimated coeffi-
cient and the result of a Wald test for its individual signifi-
cance in brackets. The Wald test uses robust standard errors 
that are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered by 
firm to mitigate concerns about within-firm correlation. 
Given that the value of the regression coefficients is not 
directly interpretable in nonlinear models, below we also 
comment on the estimated (average) partial effect for the 
main independent variables, but these results are not pre-
sented in the table to save space.6
We focus on columns (1)–(5) to test hypothesis H1 
about the role played by financial constraints on zero lev-
erage and on columns (1) and (6)–(8) to test hypothesis H2 
about the role played by financial flexibility. The specifi-
cation in column (1) is used as our baseline model and 
incorporates the firm’s specific explanatory variables rep-
resenting the financial constraints and financial flexibility 
approaches, the control variables defined in Panel A of 
Table 1, as well as industry, year and country dummies to 
mitigate concerns about omitted variables. The model in 
column (2) adds the composite measures of financial con-
straints, namely, the SA-index of Hadlock and Pierce 
(2010), the WW-index of Whited and Wu (2006) and the 
KZ-index of Kaplan and Zingales (1997). Columns (3)–(5) 
report the results for the models that use the dummy vari-
ables Size_d, Dividend_d, and Tangibility_d, respectively, 
to distinguish between groups of financially constrained 
(dummy variable = 1) and unconstrained firms. Finally, the 
models in columns (6)–(8) use the dummy variables 
Cash_d, Growth_d, and Profitability_d, respectively, to 
separate highly (dummy variable = 1) and little financially 
flexible firms. We consider the dummy variables one at a 
time in order to avoid a substantial loss of observations, 
since firms in the middle tercile of each variable are 
dropped from the sample, as explained before.
The applied econometric tests and criteria confirm the 
suitability of the estimated logit regression models. The 
Wald tests for the individual and joint significance of the 
explanatory variables confirm their ability to explain ZL. 
The Pseudo R-squared is always above 30%. The percent-
age of values of ZL being correctly predicted by the model 
are always around 90%.
Analyzing first the variables proxying the financial con-
straints approach, column (1) shows that both Size and 
Tangibility present a negative and statistically significant 
effect on zero leverage. Ceteris paribus, the increase of one 
standard deviation in each variable corresponds to a fall of, 
respectively, 2.6pp or 5.5pp in the firm’s likelihood of hav-
ing ZL.7 Consequently, the results suggest that smaller firms 
and firms with less collateral to debt are more likely to face 
information asymmetries and the consequent credit ration-
ing (Benmelech & Bergman, 2009; Hadlock & Pierce, 
2010; Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981), which is in accordance with 
the financial constraints hypothesis. In contrast, dividend 
payments present a positive and statistically significant 
effect on ZL, with a positive change of one standard devia-
tion in the dividend payment ratio, ceteris paribus, increas-
ing the likelihood of ZL by 33pp. This result, although 
similar to those obtained by Bessler et al. (2013) and Byoun 
and Xu (2013), disagrees with the arguments of the financial 
constraints approach, whereby firms paying lower divi-
dends are more likely to adopt zero leverage due to higher 
costs of information asymmetry.
When we add to the model the composite indexes of 
financial constraints, see column (2), the previous conclu-
sions are reinforced.8 On one hand, the sign and signifi-
cance of the Size and Tangibility variables do not change 
and the positive and significant coefficients of the SA-index 
and the WW-index variables are also in accordance with the 
financial constraints hypothesis. On the other hand, the 
effect of Dividend payout is again the opposite of that pre-
dicted by the financial constraints theory and the non-sig-
nificant coefficient of the KZ-index also does not corroborate 
that theory. Similarly, the positive coefficients of the varia-
bles Size_d and Tangibility_d on columns (3) and (5), 
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respectively, and the negative coefficient of the variable 
Dividend_d on column (4), confirm that smaller firms, 
firms with lower asset tangibility and firms paying more 
dividends have greater propensity to have zero leverage.
Overall, in spite of the contradictory results found, we 
conclude that there is some support for hypothesis H1. 
Indeed, given that the univariate analysis in section 
“Univariate analysis” had already shown that zero-leverage 
firms display on average smaller values for the KZ-index, 
and that this index is the only one that considers the actual 
value of dividend payments in its calculation, we think that 
our results suggest that both Dividend payout and KZ_index 
may not be the best proxies for financial constraints. The 
unexpected, but systematic, positive effect of dividends on 
zero leverage seems to indicate that, more than a proxy of 
the financial constraints experienced by zero-leverage 
Table 6. Internal determinants of zero leverage.
Independent 
variables


















































































































Wald test for 
joint significance
2454.25*** 2273.11*** 1681.78*** 2179.35*** 2156.97*** 1901.06*** 1989.10*** 2141.40***
Pseudo R2 0.3295 0.3317 0.3582 0.3085 0.3434 0.3364 0.3213 0.3136
Correct 
classification
91.45% 91.38% 91.39% 89.49% 90.50% 89.01% 90.02% 89.37%
No. of 
observations
64,017 59,487 41,157 48,198 41,669 41,579 42,030 41,469
The table presents the results of eight logit regression models for the dependent variable ZL, which takes the value of 1 if the firm has no debt in a 
given year and 0 otherwise. The models differ on the set of independent variables considered: column (1) uses traditional firm-specific indicators of 
financial constraints and flexibility; column (2) adds the composite measures of financial constraints proxied by the variables SA-index, WW-index, and 
the KZ-index; columns (3)–(8) instead add the dummy variables Size_d, Dividend_d, Tangibility_d, Cash_d, Growth_d, or Profitability_d, respectively. All 
models include year, industry and country dummies as well as the control variables defined in Panel A of Table 1. For each independent variable we 
report the regression coefficients and the z-statistics (in brackets). Robust standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered by firm.
*Indicates statistical significance at 10%.
**Indicates statistical significance at 5%.
***Indicates statistical significance at 1%.
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firms, dividends may act mainly as a mechanism control-
ling for managerial entrenchment arising from excessive 
free cash-flows, and therefore as a substitute for debt for 
that purpose (Easterbrook, 1984) or as a way to establish a 
good reputation with shareholders to obtain financing via 
equity issuances and therefore avoid raising debt (Byoun & 
Xu, 2013). However, there is an active debate about the 
ability of composite measures of financial constraints to 
effectively identify financial constraints (Farre-Mensa, & 
Ljungqvist, 2016). Our results seem to confirm the doubts 
cast by Hadlock and Pierce (2010) and Whited and Wu 
(2006) regarding the use of the KZ-index as a measure of 
financial constraints, since, for example, this index tends to 
classify large and overinvested firms as constrained firms 
(Whited and Wu, 2006). Moreover, as debt loads the 
KZ-index positively and higher values of the index mean 
higher financial constraints, zero-leverage firms have more 
chances to be classified as financially unconstrained.
Concerning the variables representing the financial 
flexibility approach, that is, Cash holdings, Growth oppor-
tunities, and Profitability, column (1) shows that they 
have, as predicted by that theory, positive and statistically 
significant effects on the firm’s likelihood of having zero 
leverage. Specifically, the increase of one standard devia-
tion in the level of cash holdings, with the other variables 
remaining constant, increases by around 26.5pp a firm’s 
likelihood of having zero leverage, while a similar change 
in the Growth opportunities and Profitability variables 
present a lower economic impact (approximately 0.3pp 
and 2.2pp, respectively). These results are in accordance 
with the arguments of the financial flexibility theory, 
whereby firms with high internal liquidity, represented by 
high cash holdings and profitability and valuable growth 
opportunities, choose zero leverage to hold on debt capac-
ity, in order to fund future good growth opportunities 
(Marchica & Mura, 2010; Rapp et al., 2014).
Columns (6)–(8) show that results are quite similar 
when we use only the extreme terciles of the financial flex-
ibility measures. The positive coefficients of the variables 
Cash_d, Growth opportunities, and Profitability_d con-
firm that cash-rich firms, with greater future prospects and 
profitability, are more likely to adopt zero-leverage poli-
cies. Thus, highly financially flexible firms, namely, those 
in the top tercile of each proxy of financial flexibility, 
show a greater propensity to be debt-free. Hence, on the 
basis of these results, hypothesis H2 is validated.
Results for the external determinants of zero leverage. The 
results for the models including external determinants of 
zero leverage are reported in Table 7. Using the first model 
in Table 6 as baseline, the model in column (1) incorpo-
rates the Market system dummy variable to control the spe-
cific effect of the financial system on zero leverage 
(hypothesis H3) and the Crisis variable to capture the spe-
cific effect of the recent crisis on zero leverage (hypothesis 
H4). The model in column (2) adds the interaction variable 
Market × Crisis, which allows testing whether the effects 
of the crisis depend on the financial system of the country 
(hypothesis H5). In columns (3)–(4), the Market system 
variable is replaced by other variables also characterizing 
or affecting the functioning of the financial system of each 
country: column (3) considers the Stock market capitaliza-
tion variable and column (4) the Legal system variable. All 
models discussed in this section use proxies for countries 
specificities or for the crisis period and, therefore, country 
and year dummies are excluded from the regression 
analysis.
Focusing on column (1), we confirm the importance of 
the financial system’s development on zero leverage. The 
Market system dummy variable has a positive and statisti-
cally significant coefficient, implying that a firm located in 
a European market-based financial system is more likely 
to have zero leverage, as also found by Ghoul et al. (2018). 
Specifically, belonging to a market-based financial system 
rather than to a bank-based one, ceteris paribus, increases 
by around 6.4pp the firm’s probability of having zero lev-
erage. The results validate hypothesis H3, confirming that 
firms’ greater dependence on bank finance in bank-based 
financial systems, as is mostly the case in Europe 
(Langfield & Pagano, 2016), implies that the likelihood of 
a firm having zero leverage is lower than in market-based 
financial systems.
The results on the Crisis dummy variable reveal that, 
overall, the 2008 financial crisis and the recent sovereign 
debt crises had a positive and statistically significant effect 
in explaining zero leverage, and that, during this period, 
the likelihood of firms adopting zero leverage increased by 
around 1.5pp. This validates hypothesis H4 and suggests 
that the recent crises had an impact on decisions related to 
firms’ capital structure in the European context, implying 
a greater trend toward zero leverage during this period and 
corroborating the findings of Morais et al. (2020).
Regarding the joint effects of financial system and 
financial crisis, see column (2), we find that the coefficient 
of Market × Crisis is positive and significant. This means 
that the 2008 crisis had a higher impact on the zero-lever-
age phenomenon in countries with market-based systems, 
as postulated by hypothesis H5. Interestingly, the variable 
Crisis is no longer significant, which implies that zero-
leverage propensity was not affected by the 2008 crisis in 
countries with bank-based systems. In contrast, because 
the sum of the coefficients associated to the variables 
Crisis and Market × Crisis is positive (0.312) and signifi-
cant (p = .000), the 2008 crisis increased the propensity for 
zero leverage in countries with market-based systems. 
Therefore, while we cannot reject that the 2008 financial 
crisis increased the overall propensity for zero leverage, 
see column (1), we find that such effect is only significant 
in market-based oriented systems. A possible explanation 
for these findings is the closer ties between firms and 
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Table 7. External determinants of zero leverage.






























































Market × Crisis 0.275**
(2.43)
 
Stock market capitalization 0.424***
(4.06)
 







Crisis × Legal system 0.477***
(4.71)
Wald test for joint significance 2414.53*** 2444.96*** 2184.49*** 2439.03***
Pseudo R2 0,2990 0.2992 0.2846 0.2926
Correct classification 91.27% 91.28% 91.69% 91.20%
No. of observations 64,017 64,017 58,259 64,017
The table presents the results of four logit regression models for the dependent variable ZL, which takes the value of 1 if the firm has no debt 
in a given year and 0 otherwise. Using the first model in Table 6 as baseline, column (1) adds the variables Market system and Crisis; column (2) 
adds the interaction variable Market × Crisis; and column (3) and column (4) replace the Market system variable by the Stock market capitalization 
and the Legal system variables, respectively. All models include industry dummies as well as the control variables defined in Panel A of Table 1. 
For each independent variable we report the regression coefficients and the z-statistics (in brackets). Robust standard errors are adjusted for 
heteroscedasticity and clustered by firm.
*Indicates statistical significance at 10%.
**Indicates statistical significance at 5%.
***Indicates statistical significance at 1%.
banks that tend to be established in countries with bank-
based systems (Leland & Pyle, 1977). Instead of being 
forced to renounce the use of debt, these firms may benefit 
from their good relation and partnership with banks to 
renegotiate credit lines.
Columns (3) and (4) show that using alternative proxies 
for the country’s specificities do not change our main find-
ings. Column (3) shows that more developed stock mar-
kets potentiate the zero-leverage phenomenon and column 
(4) reveals that firms located in common law countries are 
more likely to have zero leverage. Because common law 
countries favor the development of market-based financial 
systems (Demirgüç-Kunt & Levine, 1999) and having a 
more developed stock market is a characteristic of such 
financial systems, these results confirm that European 
firms located in countries with market-based financial sys-
tems are more likely to have zero leverage.
The models in columns (3) and (4) also confirm that the 
crisis period increased the propensity for zero leverage in 
countries with market-based systems. In column (3) that 
effect depends on the sign and significance of the sum of 
the coefficient of Crisis with the product of the coefficient 
of Crisis × Stock market capitalization by the variable 
Stock market capitalization. This sum is only positive and 
significant for values of Stock market capitalization higher 
than 0.616 (10% significance level), 0.639 (5%) or 0.680 
(1%) and is negative and significant for values lower than 
0.218 (10%), 0.146 (5%) or −0.040 (1%). During the crisis 
period all four market-based countries in our sample dis-
played a value higher than 0.616 for that variable, implying 
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Table 8. Interactions between firm’s internal and external 
determinants of zero leverage.





































Market × Cash holdings 0.475*
(1.67)
 
Market × Growth opportunities −0.015
(−0.57)
 
Market × Profitability 0.645**
(2.55)
 
Crisis × Size 0.038
(1.29)
Crisis × Dividend payout 0.946
(0.59)
Crisis × Tangibility 0.095
(0.31)
Wald test for joint significance 2488.93*** 2451.01***
Pseudo R2 0.3000 0,2993
Correct classification 91.28% 91.27%
No. of observations 64,017 64,017
The table presents the results of two logit regression models for the 
dependent variable ZL, which takes the value of 1 if the firm has no 
debt in a given year and is 0 otherwise. Using the second model in 
Table 7 as baseline, column (1) adds the interaction variables Market × 
Cash holdings, Market × Growth opportunities and Market × Profitability, 
while column (2) adds the interaction variables Crisis × Size, Crisis × 
Dividend payout and Crisis × Tangibility. All models include industry 
dummies as well as the control variables defined in Panel A of Table 
1. For each independent variable we report the regression coefficients 
and the z-statistics (in brackets). Robust standard errors are adjusted 
for heteroscedasticity and clustered by firm.
*Indicates statistical significance at 10%.
**Indicates statistical significance at 5%.
***Indicates statistical significance at 1%.
that the propensity for zero leverage was significantly 
higher in those years; for most bank-based countries the 
value of Stock market capitalization was between 0.218 
and 0.616 and thus the impact of the global crisis was not 
statistically relevant; and for Greece the effect of the global 
crisis even decreased significantly (10% level) the propen-
sity for zero leverage in 2011 and 2012. Regarding the 
effect of the legal system, see column (4), while the coef-
ficient of Crisis is not significant, the sum of the coeffi-
cients associated to the variables Crisis and Crisis × Legal 
system is positive (0.373) and significant (p = .000), imply-
ing that the probability of observing the zero-leverage phe-
nomenon increased significantly during the crisis period in 
countries with common law systems, but not in those with 
civil law systems.
Interactions between external and internal zero-leverage 
determinants. In this section we allow the effect of inter-
nal and external determinants of zero leverage to be inter-
related. For this purpose, we use as baseline the second 
model of Table 7, which incorporates all variables rele-
vant for the hypotheses H1 H5 already tested, and add 
interaction terms between firm’s internal and external 
determinants of zero leverage. Table 8 displays the results 
obtained. The model in column (1) includes the interac-
tion variables Market × Cash holdings, Market × 
Growth opportunities and Market × Profitability, in 
order to test the joint effects on zero leverage of financial 
system and financial flexibility (hypothesis H6). To test 
the joint effects of the 2008 crisis and financial con-
straints (hypothesis H7), the model in column (2) includes 
the interaction variables Crisis × Size, Crisis × Dividend 
Payout and Crisis × Tangibility.
According to column (1), we find some evidence sup-
porting hypothesis H6, since only the effect of Growth 
opportunities is similar in bank- and market-based finan-
cial systems. Indeed, the positive and significant coefficient 
of interaction term Market × Cash holdings shows that 
firm’s cash ratios have a stronger effect on zero leverage in 
market- than in bank-based systems. Moreover, Profitability 
is no longer significant but its interaction with Market sys-
tem is, which implies that firm profitability has a significant 
and positive effect on the probability of a firm having zero 
leverage (sum of the coefficients = .452, p = .0000) only in 
market-based systems. Therefore, as hypothesized, firms 
located in market-based financial systems, by having a 
wider range of alternative funding sources, are more prone 
to use their profits and internal liquidity to preserve debt 
capacity to fund future investments.
In contrast, in column (2) we find that none of the coef-
ficients relative to the interaction variables where Crisis is 
present is significant, which means that the effects of the 
variables proxying financial constraints were similar in 
crisis and non-crisis periods. This suggests that eventual 
increases in the likelihood of zero leverage during the cri-
sis period were not the consequence of additional restric-
tions imposed by creditors to grant debt to more constrained 
firms, but probably firms’ own decision, which corrobo-
rates previous findings by Kahle and Stulz (2013) and 
Morais et al. (2020) that the 2008 crisis reduced firm’s 
debt levels primarily by demand and not by supply-side 
reasons. Thus, hypothesis H7 is rejected.
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Robustness tests. This section considers several depar-
tures from the model reported in the second column of 
Table 7 to evaluate the robustness of our results.9 First, 
alternative dependent variables are used. Second, alterna-
tive econometric models (probit, random effects, fixed 
effects) are estimated. Third, models appropriate to deal 
with potential omitted variable bias and endogeneity 
issues are considered.
Table 9 presents the results for the models that use alter-
native dependent variables to ZL for measuring debt con-
servatism. The models in columns (1) and (2) replace ZL 
by, respectively, the AZL and ZL3 variables defined in 
Table 1. These alternative measures of financial conserva-
tism allow us to examine the determinants of, respectively, 
low debt levels (Strebulaev & Yang, 2013) and persistent 
zero-leverage policies (Devos et al., 2012). Columns (3) 
and (4) consider only long-term debt and short-term debt, 
respectively, to classify a firm as having zero leverage, 
instead of total debt as in the base model. In all cases, the 
results are quite similar to those found before for the base 
case.
Table 10 presents results from four alternative econo-
metric methods. columns (1), (2), (3), and (4) are estimated 

















































































Wald test for joint significance 2954.50*** 1946.87*** 2605.15*** 2561.14***
Pseudo R2 0.2735 0.2641 0.2448 0.2485
Correct classification 82.36% 94.39% 84.75% 88.44%
No. of observations 64,017 64,017 64,017 64,017
This table presents the results of four logit regression models. Using as baseline model the second column of Table 7, each model uses an 
alternative dependent variable to ZL: Column (1) uses the AZL variable; column (2) the ZL3 variable; column (3) the Long-term ZL variable; and 
column (4) the Short-term ZL variable. All variables are defined on Panel B of Table 1. All models include industry dummies as well as the control 
variables defined in Panel A of Table 1. For each independent variable we report the regression coefficients and the z-statistics (in brackets). Robust 
standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered by firm.
*Indicates statistical significance at 10%.
**Indicates statistical significance at 5%.
***Indicates statistical significance at 1%.
using, respectively, Random-effects Logit, Fixed-effects 
Logit, Pooled Probit, and Random-effects Probit meth-
ods.10 Again, our main findings are robust to the estimation 
method applied, since the only explanatory variable that 
lost significance (in two out of the four models) was 
Growth opportunities and the other two proxies for finan-
cial flexibility kept theirs.
Finally, recognizing that endogeneity is a real problem 
in corporate empirical finance due to omitted variables and 
reverse causality, we consider, in Table 11, five further 
models that try to mitigate the effects of potential endoge-
neity issues. First, in Panel A we consider models with 
additional control variables, which have not been consid-
ered in our main models because they have been rarely 
used in zero-leverage studies (Short-term liabilities other 
than debt and lagged ZL), we could not get good measures 
of it (firm’s Age—see footnote 3) or its utilization implies 
a substantial loss of observations (corporate governance 
measures). The model in column (1), which adds the Short-
term liabilities and Age variables in order to control for the 
influence of firm’s non-interest liabilities and maturity on 
its overall debt demand and capacity, does not change our 
main findings. The model in column (3), which accounts 
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Table 10. Robustness tests using alternative econometric methods.












































































Wald test for joint significance 2745.08*** 1455.43*** 2541.75*** 2975.12***
Pseudo R2 0.3038  
Correct classification 91.25%  
No. of observations 64,017 14,203 64,017 64,017
This table re-estimates the baseline model presented on the second column of Table 7, using alternative econometric methods: column (1) uses 
Random-effects Logit; column (2) Fixed-effects Logit; column (3) Pooled Probit; and column (4) Random-effects Probit methods. All models include 
industry dummies as well as the control variables defined in Panel A of Table 1. For each independent variable we report the regression coefficients 
and the z-statistics (in brackets). Robust standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered by firm.
*Indicates statistical significance at 10%.
**Indicates statistical significance at 5%.
***Indicates statistical significance at 1%.
for the persistence of zero-leverage policies, also produces 
similar conclusions. Column (2) reports the results for the 
model that recognizes that, because debt may be used as a 
mechanism to control for their possible opportunistic 
actions, managers may by tempted to follow a zero-lever-
age policy. None of the additional controls considered, 
three board-specific measures (Board size, Board inde-
pendency, and CEO duality) and a measure of ownership 
structure (Ownership concentration), are statistically sig-
nificant, probably due the considerable loss of observa-
tions (almost 90%) originated by their presence in the 
model. Probably for the same reason, although no opposite 
results to our previous findings were found, some explana-
tory variables lost their significance.
In panel B, column (4), similarly to previous empirical 
studies on debt conservatism that deal with endogeneity 
concerns, we lag all independent variables by one year 
(e.g., Bessler et al., 2013; Ghoul et al., 2018). Alternatively, 
in column (5) we consider an instrumental variables 
approach to deal with possible reverse causality between 
debt and firm size and dividend payments.11 Indeed, debt-
free firms may be foregoing the opportunity to finance 
their investment opportunities at a lower cost and hence 
may invest less and present lower size; and firms with debt 
contracts may face covenants requiring low or no dividend 
payments and hence zero-leverage firms may be more 
prone to pay higher dividends. Considering the binary 
nature of the dependent variable, the model in column (5) 
is based on the probit model with continuous endogenous 
covariates proposed by Newey (1987). It assumes Size and 
Dividend payout to be endogenous and uses the first lag of 
the remaining firm-specific variables as instruments. The 
first-stage F statistics show that the selected instruments 
are correlated with both Size and Dividend payout.12
Again, the only explanatory variable that loses signifi-
cance, and only in one case, is Growth opportunities and 
hence our main findings are not changed.
Conclusion
This article analyses the zero-leverage phenomenon in 
Europe, a continent greatly dominated by bank-based finan-
cial systems. During the 1995–2016 period, 10.84% of the 
observations in our sample of listed firms corresponded to 
debt-free firms. This figure is slightly lower than that 
reported in most previous studies, but it hides a great 
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Table 11. Robustness tests controlling for endogeneity problems.












































































































 Dividend payout 1707.65***
Wald test for joint significance 2226.00*** 521.49*** 9688.94*** 2153.63*** 7488.92***
Pseudo R2 0.3073 0.3866 0.5763 0.285  
Correct classification 92.11% 96.06% 95.54% 91.30%  
No. of observations 60,733 6,963 64,017 56,513 54,947
Using the second column of Table 7 as baseline model, Panel A considers several additional control variables: column (1) adds Age and Short-term 
liabilities; column (2) adds corporate governance and ownership indicators (Board size, Board independency, CEO duality, and Ownership concentration); 
and column (3) adds the lagged dependent variable ZL(t–1). All variables are defined in Table 1. In Panel B, column (4) re-estimates the model 
on the second column of Table 7 with all independent variables lagged by one year, while column (5) uses a probit model with continuous 
endogenous covariates as regression method. All models include industry dummies as well as the control variables defined in Panel A of Table 
1. For each independent variable we report the regression coefficients and the z-statistics (in brackets). Robust standard errors are adjusted for 
heteroscedasticity and clustered by firm.
*Indicates statistical significance at 10%.
**Indicates statistical significance at 5%.
***Indicates statistical significance at 1%.
heterogeneity among countries. Indeed, we find that the 
financial system has a great relevance for the distribution of 
debt-free firms: while, on average, around 16% of the obser-
vations recorded in market-based financial systems corre-
spond to debt-free firms, the corresponding figure recorded 
in bank-based financial systems is only about 6%. Moreover, 
while in market-based financial systems zero leverage pre-
sents a clear upward trend, in bank-based financial systems 
the percentage of debt-free firms increased less than 1pp 
between 1996 and 2016.
The importance of the financial system for the explana-
tion of the zero-leverage phenomenon is reinforced by the 
results of our econometric analysis. After controlling for 
many other factors, we find that firms located in countries 
with market-based systems have a significant higher prob-
ability of being debt-free. We also find that the recent 
European financial and sovereign crises promoted firm’s 
zero leverage by significantly increasing the probability of 
a firm being debt-free, both in terms of short- and long-
term debt, but this effect seems to have been limited to 
countries with a market-based system. Finally, we found 
some support that the financial flexibility hypothesis, 
which argues that firms may be debt-free by their own 
choice, seems to be a more relevant explanation for zero 
leverage in market-based systems, probably due to the 
wider range of funding options that are available in coun-
tries with that system.
An active research topic in the zero-leverage literature is 
whether it results mainly from frictions and impositions cre-
ated by the financial market or from firms’ own financing 
decisions. We found that debt-free firms in Europe tend to 
be smaller and less profitable and to have fewer tangible 
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assets. However, they display higher levels of cash holdings 
and growth opportunities and pay more dividends than lev-
eraged firms. This shows that neither the financial flexibility 
nor the financial constraints approaches can explain entirely 
the zero-leverage phenomenon, with both of them being 
useful to explain the zero-leverage policies of particular 
groups of firms. We also found that the financial constraints 
approach did not gain importance during the crisis period.
In addition to contributing to the scientific literature on 
zero leverage, our article also has some interesting impli-
cations for practitioners, managers and government enti-
ties. For example, given that for some firms zero leverage 
is an imposition of the financial market, it would be impor-
tant for firms located in countries with market-based sys-
tems to develop closer ties with banks and/or to focus on 
the creation of a financial slack that could prepare them 
better for periods of uncertainty. Both measures would 
result in a greater willingness of creditors to make credit 
available, in better conditions, to those firms, allowing 
them to keep their investment plans through periods of 
deteriorated credit conditions. Interesting topics for future 
research are, inter alia, the comparison of the performance 
of debt-free and leveraged firms and investigating the 
existence, or not, of target debt ratios for both groups of 
firms. The development and application of suitable meth-
ods to deal with multiple endogenous variables in the 
framework of the probit model, together with the search 
for potentially better instruments than those used in our 
study, are another important avenue for future research.
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Notes
 1. Strebulaev and Yang (2013) show that, between 1962 and 
2009, an average of 10.2% of large listed US firms followed 
a zero-leverage policy, with the proportion of zero-leverage 
firms increasing from around 5% in the beginning of the 
1980s to more than 19% in the end of 2000s. Devos et al. 
(2012) contributes to the discussion adding that more than 
11% of the firms in their sample had no debt during three 
consecutive years.
 2. See for instance the annual financial reports of the firms 
highlighted or check the news on 15 debt-free S&P 500 
firms posted by Moreano and Toscano (2014) at https://
www.cnbc.com/2012/01/25/15-Companies-with-Zero-
Debt.html.
 3. Other firm-specific indicator sometimes used in the lit-
erature as a proxy for financial constraints is firm age. 
However, this information was not available in the data-
base when we drew the sample. The only related informa-
tion that we could get was the first date of trading available 
in DataStream, which only allows us to obtain the number 
of years since that date. For this reason, and also because 
firm size and firm age are usually highly correlated (see the 
detailed analysis by Dang, 2013), we decided to consider 
the age variable only in the robustness section, as an addi-
tional control variable.
 4. Each firm in one group is matched with at least one firm in 
the other group and all observations are potential matches 
regardless of how dissimilar they are.
 5. Table 5 does not include the dependent variable and the 
dummy explanatory variables, because the Pearson coeffi-
cient is not appropriate to measure correlations involving 
categorical variables. However, we calculated the Spearman 
rank correlation between the dependent variable and each 
one the continuous explanatory variables and in all cases we 
found a significant correlation at the 1% level.
 6. The calculated partial effects measure the variation in the 
probability of following a ZL policy due to a one standard 
deviation increase in a continuous explanatory variable (xj) 
or a change from 0 to 1 in a dummy variable (Wooldridge, 
2012). For continuous covariates, we first calculate for 
each firm the derivative of Pr(ZL = 1|x), see equation (1), 
to xj, which is given by PE j= +( ) ( )β β βexp / [ ]x exp x1 2
. Then, we calculate the average of the individual PE and 
multiply it by one standard deviation of xj. For dummy vari-
ables, we first compute the value of equation (1) for each 
firm setting xj = 1 (and evaluating the other variables at their 
sample values) and then repeat that calculation considering 
xj = 0. Finally, we compute the average of the differences 
between the two values obtained for each firm.
 7. The absolute variation of the independent variable that corre-
sponds to a one standard deviation may be found in Table 3. In 
the case of Size, which is a logged variable, one standard devia-
tion corresponds to a change of 9,375 Euro in total assets.
 8. The inclusion of these indexes one at a time does not change 
our findings.
 9. Using the models of Table 8 as baseline for the regression 
checks does not change the main findings reported in this 
section.
10. Fixed-effects estimators are available only for logit mod-
els and promote a considerable loss of observations, since 
observations without within group variance are omitted. 
Thus, firms with ZL equal to zero or one in all years of 
the period analyzed are excluded from the model. Also, all 
time-constant dummy variables are dropped.
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11. We thank one of the referees for this suggestion.
12. In addition to the first-stage F statistics, we also computed 
Cragg and Donald (1993) minimum eigenvalue statistic as a 
test for weak instruments. This test was designed for the lin-
ear regression model and therefore it should be interpreted 
with caution in our framework. Nevertheless, the results 
obtained makes us confident that we do not have a weak 
instrument problem. Indeed, assuming a linear specification 
for ZL, the null hypothesis of having weak instruments is 
clearly rejected: the value of the minimum eigenvalue statis-
tic is 1690.81, while the critical value for a 5% relative bias 
of the two-stage least squares estimator is only 18.76 and 
the critical value for a 10% size distortion in a 5% Wald test 
is only 29.32.
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